Multi-sided digital platforms complicate competition-law analysis because they coordinate interactions among several groups while allocating prices and costs across them. In online food delivery, platforms may charge consumers delivery and platform fees, collect commissions from restaurants and sell advertising or enhanced visibility. These arrangements raise questions about whether the combined economic burden of platform participation is adequately captured by examining each charge separately.
This case comment examines the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) approach to these issues, focusing on its order in R. Suresh v Eternal Limited, which almost settled allegations concerning Zomato’s platform fees, delivery charges, menu-price differences and alleged drip pricing. The Commission found no prima facie contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, emphasising the additional services involved in online delivery and consumers’ ability to reject an order before placing it.
The paper argues that the Commission’s decision is defensible on the limited evidence presented, but that multi-sidedness and service differentiation should not themselves preclude scrutiny of a platform’s overall pricing architecture. It distinguishes dominance from abuse, consumer-protection concerns from competition-law violations and preliminary findings from final determinations. It proposes a structured inquiry into market power, aggregate prices, commission pass-through, disclosure, competitive alternatives and the costs and value of platform services. The framework is intended to distinguish legitimate monetisation from potentially unfair conduct without treating platform fees or price differences as inherently abusive.