Indian federalism represents a constitutionally engineered balance between unity and diversity, designed to accommodate vast socio-cultural heterogeneity while maintaining the integrity of the nation-state. The Constitution of India constructs a federal structure with a strong unitary bias, ensuring that the Union retains overriding authority in matters of national importance while the States exercise autonomy within defined constitutional spheres. Over the decades, Centre–State relations have undergone continuous transformation shaped by political realignments, economic reforms, and judicial interventions. This paper explores the doctrinal foundations of Indian federalism, the constitutional distribution of powers, and the evolving dynamics of intergovernmental relations in contemporary India. The study examines the legislative, administrative, and financial aspects of federalism by analyzing key constitutional provisions such as Articles 245–263, the Seventh Schedule, and the emergency provisions under Articles 352–360. It draws from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, including landmark decisions such as State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), and Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), to highlight how judicial interpretation has shaped the contours of Indian federalism. The research also assesses institutions such as the Inter-State Council, Finance Commission, and the Goods and Services Tax Council, which have become crucial to cooperative federalism while simultaneously raising concerns about fiscal centralization. Contemporary challenges—including the politicization of the Governor’s office, tensions surrounding GST compensation, disputes over law-and-order prerogatives, and the centralization of national policies—are critically analyzed. The paper argues that although the Constitution provides a robust framework for federal governance, political and fiscal practices at times undermine the federal spirit and tilt the system toward central dominance. Strengthening institutional mechanisms, upholding judicial safeguards, and reinforcing cooperative federalism are essential for sustaining democratic pluralism in India. The study concludes that federalism in contemporary India remains a dynamic project whose future depends on continuous negotiation between constitutional principles and political realities..